

G. R. M. Koenigstein
DEPARTMENT STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
January 20, 1958

ED

EUR - Mr. Vest

Returned herewith is the EUR memorandum concerning clarification of the President's reply to Bulganin.

Although the Secretary signed the telegram at Tab A, he took no action on the second recommendation. Rather than resubmit the memorandum at a time when he is extremely busy preparing for the Baghdad Pact meeting, it is suggested that Mr. Elbrick make the decision on the second recommendation - perhaps in consultation with Mr. Murphy in the light of their discussion with the Secretary today.

*Based
on
Elbrick*

1/21/58

DRT.
Donald R. Toussaint
S/S-RO
Ext. 4154

Att: EUR memo to S 1/14, "Clarification of Pres's ltr to Bulganin". (S/S 478)

~~SECRET~~

This memorandum consists of 1 page.
Copy 1 of 9 copies, Series A.

Bureau of European Affairs

MEMORANDUM

478
5.1

To : The Secretary

January 14, 1958

Through: S/S *R*

From : EUR - C. Burke Elbrick *CEB*

Subject: Clarification of President's Letter to Bulganin.

Discussion:

The Embassy at London has asked ^(Tab B) for clarification of the statement in the President's reply to Bulganin that the United States is prepared to negotiate specific arrangements regarding force levels and deployments in connection with German reunification. This part of our letter has also attracted attention in the press. It would be useful to give guidance both to some of our missions and to USIA on this point. An attached draft telegram places this statement in the perspective of our European policy. If it meets with your approval, I would propose that it be furnished to USIA for guidance.

762A-12/1-1458

Recommendation:

1. That you sign the attached telegram. (Tab A) Signed and despatched 1/14/58
2. That you agree that guidance to USIA may be based on this telegram.

Concurrences:

CBE S/P - Mr. Matthews
G - Mr. Murphy
P - *MB* - Mr. Berding

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab A - Draft telegram.
- Tab B - Telegram 4077 from London.
- Tab C - Berlin Declaration.
- Tab D - Dallas speech.
- Tab E - President's reply to Bulganin.

R
EUR:GER:JJReinstein:al 1/14/58

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority *ND&F/US*

By *33958* NARA, Date *11/11/11*

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

1958 JUN 17 PM 9 30

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SENT TO: Amembassy LONDON 5040

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Origins

RPTD INFO: Amembassy BONN 1869
Amembassy PARIS 2616
Amembassy MOSCOW 780

EUR
Info

RMR

PARIS FOR EMBASSY USRO AND THURSTON

SS

G

SP

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SAE

INR

P

Your 4077 repeated Paris 677 Bonn 378 Moscow 109.

Under Western proposals for reunification of Germany put forward at Geneva, freely elected German Government would have right to request withdrawal of forces stationed in Germany. We have always assumed that freely elected German Government would request withdrawal of Soviet forces and assume Soviets also think so. We have recognized that Soviets would not be prepared to make major military concession of this character without reciprocal concessions on our part. Western proposals at Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference therefore included offer to agree on limitations on forces and armaments in Eastern and Western Europe and provided for /QUOTE special measures UNQUOTE relating to disposition of military forces and installations in parts of zone lying closest to line of demarcation between reunified Germany and Eastern European countries. Special measures concept was spelled out slightly more in paragraph 9 of Berlin Declaration of July 29, 1957 in which it was stated that as part of acceptable European security arrangements, Western

Dis.
Desired
(Office
Only)

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:JReinstein:al 1/14/68

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

John Foster Dulles

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Elbrick RA - Mr. Timmons EE - Mr. Freers G- Mr. Murphy

P- - Mr. Bowdoin

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Page 2 of telegram to Ambassador LONDON~~SECRET~~

Western Powers were prepared to give assurance that, in event of a reunified Germany choosing to join NATO, they would not take military advantage as a result of withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Language in letter to Bulganin to which you refer states ^{position} ~~fact~~ which has never fully ^{by the public} been/understood. Western Powers have been prepared to negotiate military and political assurances of far-reaching significance with respect to Europe as part of agreement for unification of Germany by free elections. Lack of public understanding is attributable in part to carefully phrased language of Geneva proposals, which were intended as genuine basis for negotiation. We have not considered it feasible to spell out in detail what arrangements on forces, armaments and deployment we would consider acceptable in advance of serious negotiations Soviets. As to our willingness to enter into such negotiations, however, there should be no doubt.

In any discussions you have on passage in letter to Bulganin referred to, you should make clear that our willingness to negotiate such arrangements is conditioned on agreement to remove the principal potential threat to peace in Europe, i.e., division of Germany. You should also make clear that while Western Powers have never required that a reunified Germany should be member of NATO, we are opposed to imposition of neutrality on Germany. It will be for freely elected German Government to determine its association with other countries. We do not believe that discriminatory status can be imposed on country of size and vigor of Germany. Should German Government decide to associate with West we are prepared to give additional assurances to Soviet Union that this association will not menace Soviet security. Furthermore, while we obviously

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obviously cannot give assurances with respect to what might happen in Eastern Europe if reunification of Germany altered situation there (as we believe it would), we have indicated clearly that it is not our desire to project our military influence into Eastern Europe or to establish cordon sanitaire around Soviet Union (See section of Secretary's Dallas speech of October 27, 1956 on Captive Nations). We are not RPT not prepared to negotiate regarding existence of NATO itself.

DULLES